Conflict in Asia in the Aftermath of World War II

A Continent Erupts is an excellent operational summary of Asia in the decade after the close of the Second World War, covering all the major regions which suffered continuing violence during those years. The civil wars, decolonizations, and foreign interventions in Asia had drastic consequences lasting well into our present. While Continent’s premise is somewhat undercut by its own execution and might have enjoyed a larger scope to place Asia more firmly in the global historical context, or perhaps have focused more individually into each conflict examined; Continent is an admirable chronicle of Asia’s turmoil during that period.

Continent begins with the Japanese occupation, nationalist movements, and collapsing European imperial authority. Indonesian nationalist attempts to seize power is answered by the Dutch who ultimately lose colonial control because of political and material exhaustion from the Second World War. China’s Communist civil war victory over the Nationalists is examined from Communist advantages and Nationalist weaknesses, through to Taiwan becoming a Nationalist refuge, the resulting domestic political debate in the United States, and the effect on global foreign policies, including events in Vietnam and Korea.

South Korea then is critiqued as North Korea, supported by Russian and Chinese Communists, attempted to unify Korea by force, with United States unpreparedness a major factor in North Korea’s initial successes. The subsequent North Korean reversal by determined United States-led intervention is itself reversed by Chinese Communist intervention until American firepower forces a stalemate on exhausted Communist resources. Continent closes with the French debacle in Indochina, with North Vietnam gaining the upper hand in the region.

Continent provides a clear military history explaining campaigns, command decisions, logistics, troop morale, and strategic miscalculations. Concrete military details such as training, geography, weather, and the ability of armies to adapt are provided with a thoroughness often overlooked in more political examinations. The role of subversion tactics is incorporated along with the ham-handed arrogance of certain parties. Continent is an easily read narrative of military events provided with strategic and political contexts.

The work challenges any limited view of Asians as non-player characters in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Continent leaves no doubt that Communist ideology played an enormous role in the post-Second World War conflicts. But Asians are portrayed with their own motivations, their own individual circumstances, which may or may not have fit into the broader Cold War interests of the then two Superpowers. Such are lessons which hold true whether we deal with tribal alliances in the Middle East, regional ethnic conflicts in Africa, or any jealous nations of Europe.

Continent also touches on how decolonization and nationalism was often violent and morally complicated. The collapse of empires did not automatically produce freedom or peace. It often produced massacres, revenge killings, civil wars, and authoritarianism in excess of their former colonial masters. Blind romantic idealism, taken advantage of by local power seekers, often conveniently overlooks any benefits brought by imperial expansions. The repeated willingness of supposed rebels and insurgents to sacrifice others for their own precious causes are demonstrated without need for further comment. Colonial powers often acted cynically and violently in trying to restore control, but nationalist and revolutionary movements also committed atrocities and employed brute violence.

In fact, Continent amply demonstrates that the key to successful “revolutionary” movements is not necessarily any inherent value in the movements themselves, but instead much more dependent on the incompetence of the old masters and the supplies of external meddlers with outside agendas. Continent‘s examples of China, Korea, and Vietnam plainly highlight how external Communist aid leveraged by blundering Western leadership was absolutely pivotal. In contrast, Communist insurgencies in Malaya and Philippines, which did not have the same successes, receive less examination.

Continent does connect conflicts across Asia as old empires tried to return, new nationalist movements demanded power, communist organizations gained strength, and civilians were trapped between rivals. These were not isolated events, but were, and continue to be, a recurring theme as Western Civilization is challenged, from within and without, as old imperialist perspectives are both fairly and unfairly criticized. The unpreparedness for conflict, the unwillingness to commit, and the inability to recognize growing threats repeated too often in history for simple rhymes.

While Continent does not dwell on the waste that occurs from not sooner committing to staying or to leaving, the lessons are clear. The United States failed to support the Nationalist Chinese but did not avoid facing the Communist Chinese in Korea or in the current competitive scenario. The United States post war rush to demobilize made Korea a tempting target, costing added casualties and now more than seven decades of commitment. Vietnam, while initially a French defeat, would cost the United States more blood and treasure than Korea even if accounting for the continued United States presence in Korea. Each of those conflicts are entire fields of study by themselves.

But in jumping from country to country, Continent sometimes can read more like a survey than a well-defined history, sacrificing depth on individual countries for breadth on Asia. Some of Continent feels like shallow disjointed accounts which deserve separate more detailed entries. For instance, the single mention of four opportune battalions of American M4 Sherman tank reinforcements seems incongruous with its assured ability to defeat the far-more-mentioned Soviet T-34 tanks (p.260), not only for the technical comparison, but also whether such battalions could even have been available from the understrength units at that time. Continent proves its point that postwar Asia was engulfed by overlapping conflicts, but can leave the feeling that some events needed better discussion than they receive.

Nor does Continent’s focus on just some conflicts address similar clashes occurring around the globe, such as the Madagascar or Algeria uprisings against the French, or the Kenya, Egypt, and Sudan uprisings against the British which, although they did not have a common Japanese occupation, did share similar nationalistic and anti-colonial aspects during the same period. The commonalities shared by the global retreat from colonialism merits further examination even if Continent understandably limited its own scope. The work's focus on certain spectacular successes downplays how other Asian insurgencies failed or dragged on, without thoroughly explaining the different outcomes.

And the mention of the often-questioned “domino theory” could have been more extensive, considering the theory’s role in United States interventions against Communism. It is arguable, after all, that if the United States had not stepped up, whether in Korea or in Vietnam, that other regional movements would have been further energized and emboldened. Continent ably points out, particularly in Korea and in Vietnam, that Communist foreign interference was hardly unlimited, and United States intervention sometimes was able to encourage those limitations. Although outside Continent’s declared scope, the results from preserving South Korea, not to mention Taiwan, gives reason if not justification for United States interventions, at least in the civic comparisons between their contrasting less-free “communist” counterparts, even without considering the starvation which regularly accompanied communist collectivisms.

Continent validly notes that Japan’s surrender in the Second World War did not end the violence in Asia, but that is as obvious as pointing out how history seldom halts even if events are not noticed. Peoples, cultures, and events often evolve without fanfare. Anti-colonialist and nationalist violence existed even prior to the First World War, just as conquest and corruption continue to the present. Continent, even for its limited time frame, could have expanded its examination more globally for a more complete view of the total human historical experience.

But regardless of what the work also could have included, A Continent Erupts delivers what it claims to be, a narrative of Postwar Asia from 1945-1955. It is enough.

                                                                – Ching Wah Chin

---///---

Our Reviewer: Ching Wah Chin, a member of NYMAS, has lectured and written widely on East Asian History. His reviews include The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, Nanjing 1937: Battle for a Doomed City, The 1929 Sino-Soviet War, War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat, Future War and the Defence of Europe, Nations in the Balance: The India-Burma Campaign, December 1943-August 1944, Ring of Fire: A New History of the World at War, 1914, All the World at War, On a Knife Edge: How Germany Lost the First World War, China's Spies, The Greater Second World War, War in Modern China, Chinese Culture and the Chinese Military, and Red Dawn Over China. 

---///---

Note: A Continent Erupts is also available in hardback, audio, e-editions.